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COMMENTS
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF STUDENTS-THE STATE'S
AUTHORITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The existence and exercise of a teacher's authority to use
corporal punishment in disciplining students has been chal-
lenged recently in both Louisiana' and federal courts. 2 The
decisions have answered important questions but in doing so
have also created new problems. This comment will examine
these recent developments and posit solutions where the law
is unsettled.
The In Loco Parentis Doctrine
To help parents fulfill their duty to provide guidance,
training and education to their offspring, common law grants
parents a privilege to use corporal punishment.3 Likewise
settled at common law is the privilege of one standing in loco
parentis (in the shoes of a parent) to chastise a child;4 how-
ever, some conflict exists as to the scope of the privilege. One
line of cases holds that parents and teachers alike are ac-
countable for the effects of physical punishment only if they
act maliciously or inflict permanent injury;5 another, while
1. Roy v. Continental Ins. Co., 313 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 318 So. 2d 47 (La. 1975).
2. Ingrahm v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976); Baker v. Owen, 395 F.
Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
3. See, e.g., Rowe v. Rugg, 117 Iowa 606, 91 N.W. 903 (1902); Carpenter v.
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E. 419 (1947); State v. Spiegel, 39 Wyo. 309,
270 P. 1064 (1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1965).
4. Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (1959); Harris v.
State, 115 Ga. 578, 41 S.E. 983 (1902); Rowe v. Rugg, 117 Iowa 606, 91 N.W. 903
(1902); Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266 (1847); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 147(2) (1965). The privilege extends to teachers [who are considered
persons in loco parentis]. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(2) (1965); 1
W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 453 (1860): "[The father] may also delegate
part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of
his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of
the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as
may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he was employed." See,
e.g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954); Sheehan v. Sturges, 53
Conn. 481, 2 A. 841 (1885); Marlar v. Bill, 181 Tenn. 100, 178 S.W.2d 634 (1944).
5. Dean v. State, 89 Ala. 46, 8 So. 38 (1890); Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7
So. 268 (1890); State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 31 Am. Dec. 416 (1837). In
Boyd and Dean the court held that the test to be applied was one of reason-
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giving parents the privilege to punish physically so long as
their motive is not malicious, holds those in loco parentis to
the requirement that corporal punishment be reasonable
under the circumstances. 6 But the weight of authority is to
the effect that neither parents 7 nor persons in loco parentis8
may exceed reasonableness in the exercise of their authority
to discipline a child.
The determination of reasonableness must be made on a
case by case basis. While some forms of punishment will al-
most always be found unreasonable, such as when punish-
ment is malicious or causes permanent injury,9 in most cases
certain factors must be considered in analyzing the reason-
ableness of disciplinary conduct. The factors generally articu-
lated are the nature of the punishment, the conduct for which
it is administered, the condition of the child, his susceptibility
to harm, and the motive of the person inflicting the punish-
ment.'0
ableness but stated that punishment was not unreasonable unless it was
inflicted with malice or caused permanent injury. Pendergrass held punish-
ment causing permanent injury per se immoderate, but said that any
punishment producing only temporary pain, however severe, could not be
unreasonable. See also Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 499, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954); Drake
v. Thomas, 310 Il1. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941).
6. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859).
7. E.g., Rowe v. Rugg, 117 Iowa 606, 91 N.W 903 (1902); Carpenter v.
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E. 419 (1947); State v. Spiegel, 39 Wyo. 309,
270 P. 1064 (1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(1) (1965).
8. E.g., Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944); Harris v.
Galilley, 125 Pa. Super. 505, 189 A. 779 (1937); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366,
206 N.W. 173 (1925); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(2) (1965).
9. E.g., Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C. 204, 47 S.E. 421 (1904) (teacher threw
pencil at student, striking him in eye and causing partial blindness, when
student turned head due to distraction).
10. See, e.g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954) (five "licks"
given for insubordination to 8-year-old in good health was reasonable); Berry
v. Arnold School Dist., 199 Ark. 1118, 137 S.W.2d 256 (1940) (whipping child
12-14 times with an edge of a piece of flooring lumber for throwing wad of
paper was unreasonable); Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377
(1944) (when 10-year-old, 89 lb., third grader refused to allow teacher to hit
him with strap and resisted principal, principal sat on him, held unreasona-
ble); Roy v. Continental Ins. Co., 313 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
318 So. 2d 47 (1975) (reasonable to strike 8th grader once with paddle for
fighting and calling teacher a "god-damn son-of-a-bitch," and to paddle him 3
or 4 more times when student continued to curse teacher); Johnson v. Horace
Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 241 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970) (unreasonable to hit
student 7 or 8 times so that paddle broke and several more times with one of
the broken pieces for an improper start in a race); Frank v. Orleans Parish
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Application of a stricter level of scrutiny to punishment
by non-parents 1 may be justified even when the test applied
to both parents and those in loco parentis is reasonableness.
12
The rationale for such a distinction appears to be that
natural affection, inherent in the parent-child relationship, is
absent when a non-parent disciplines a child. Thus, the law
presumes that a parent would not use a given degree of
punishment unless it were justified under the circumstances,
whereas a non-parent's motives, not subject to the same
natural restraint, 3 should be more carefully examined. How-
ever, the validity or weight of such a presumption may be
undermined when the frequency of child-beating cases is con-
sidered.' 4 In addition, a non-parent such as a teacher, accus-
tomed to dealing with a constant and infinite variety of mis-
behavior, may well be less likely to punish some forms of
conduct.' 5
Teachers' Authority In Louisiana
Louisiana Civil Code Articles 218 and 220 were relied on in
an early opinion by the Louisiana Attorney General for the
proposition that a teacher may use reasonable corporal
School Bd.,. 195 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 635, 197 So.
2d 653 (1967) (excessive force found on conflicting evidence that in restraining
a 4'9", 101 lb. student, a 5'8", 230 lb. teacher caused student to fall and break
arm).
11. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1965), states that the test to
be applied to both parents and those in loco parentis is reasonableness, but
lists in § 150 as one of the factors used in determining reasonableness
whether an actor is the punished child's parent.
13. See Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 121, 76 Am. Dec. 156, 164 (1859):
"This parental power is little liable to abuse, for it is continually restrained
by natural affection .... The schoolmaster has no such natural restraint....
He should be guided and restrained by judgement and wise discretion, and
hence is responsible for their reasonable exercise."
14. In East Baton Rouge Parish alone there were an estimated 600 child
beating cases referred to the Baton Rouge Child Protection Center between
September, 1974 and the present. While 40% of these were false referrals,
since there are many unreported cases, a better estimate of the actual
number of cases is ten times the valid referrals. Telephone interview with
Ms. Renee Smith, Public Information Officer, Baton Rouge Child Protection
Center, in Baton Rouge, April 1, 1976.
15. However, a counter argument can be made that this lesser tendency
to punish relates more to when certain conduct will be punished rather than
how severely seriously obstreperous conduct will be handled.
[Vol. 36
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punishment in disciplining a student.16 Article 218 gives par-
ents the right to use reasonable means to correct their
child,' 7 and Article 220 states that parents may "delegate a
part of their authority to teachers ... such as the power of...
correction ... '.8 The Attorney General's opinion espoused
the theory that parents' sending a child to school evinced an
implied delegation of their authority to correct hiih.m9 How-
ever, a few recent Louisiana cases, such as Johnson v. Horace
Mann Insurance Co., 20 indicate a trend away from the implied
delegation rationale. Although two cases previous to Johnson
had refused to decide if teachers could use reasonable
punishment since the punishment inflicted in those cases was
unreasonable, 21 the Second Circuit in Johnson indicated in
strong dicta that corporal punishment by teachers may not be
authorized at all. 22 The court noted that the implied delega-
tion theory arose when education was non-compulsory 23 and
that it may not be applicable in a compulsory education con-
text.24 The court stated that Civil Code Article 220 "does not
16. 1934-36 LA. OP. ATTY. GEN. 221 (Jan. 3, 1935).
17. "An unemancipated minor can not quit the paternal house without
the permission of his father and mother, who have the right to correct him,
provided it be done in a reasonable manner." LA. CIV. CODE art. 218.
18. Id. art. 220.
19. "[I]t has been the accepted custom in all of the schools of the State...
that the mere act of the parent in sending the child to school is implied
authority to the teacher ... to correct the child ... " 1934-36 LA. OP. ATTY.
GEN. 221 (Jan. 3, 1935).
20. 241 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
21. Houeye v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 223 La. 966, 67 So. 2d 553
(1953); Frank v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 195 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 250 La. 635, 197 So. 2d 653 (1967).
22. "[I]t may be doubtful that Louisiana law permits public school
teachers to use corporal punishment ..... " Johnson v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins.
Co., 241 So. 2d 588, 590 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
23. The first statute with general statewide applicability requiring school
attendance was enacted in 1922, La. Acts 1922, No. 222. The present compul-
sory attendance statute is LA. R.S. 17:221 (Supp. 1964).
24. LA. R.S. 17:221 (Supp. 1964) requires parents, tutors or other persons
having control of children between seven and fifteen inclusive to send the
child to a private or public school. While this comment does not deal with the
existence or basis for authority of teachers in private schools to use corporal
punishment, it seems that since the compulsory education statute requires
attendance at a private school in lieu of a public school, the implied delega-
tion theory would also be inapplicable in the private school situation. How-
ever, even though a private school could not benefit by the authorization by
the state for the use of corporal punishment in public schools, since accep-
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say that fathers and mothers do delegate the power of...
correction . . .but that [they] may delegate such power. '25
Since the punishment administered by a teacher in Roy v.
Continental Insurance Co. 26 was reasonable, that case
squarely presented to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal the
question of the authority of a teacher to use reasonable phys-
ical means. Although it cited no statute explicitly authorizing
use of physical punishment by teachers, the court stated that
several Louisiana statutes imply that corporal punishment
by a teacher is permissible; 27 additionally, the court thought
that a general rule against reasonable corporal punishment
as a means of enforcing prompt discipline would encourage
students to flaunt a teacher's authority and undermine his
ability to maintain good order. 28
Subsequent to Roy, the Louisiana legislature enacted La.
R.S. 17:416.1, which provides that "teachers, principals, and
administrators ... may . . .employ other reasonable discipli-
nary and corrective measures to maintain order in the
schools. '29 While the provision does not authorize corporal
punishment explicitly, it clearly appears to have been enacted
in response to the Roy decision. Since other methods of en-
forcing discipline were already provided in La. R.S. 17:416,3°
in order to attribute a useful purpose to the statute the new
provision should be construed to authorize teachers to employ
corporal punishment.
The legislature also provided in the new provision that
any teacher sued as a result of a disciplinary action is entitled
tance of a student is discretionary, parental delegation of authority to punish
could probably be made a condition of enrollment.
25. 241 So. 2d at 591.
26. 313 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 318 So. 2d 47 (La. 1975)
(no error of law on the facts found).
27. The court cited LA. CIV. CODE art. 220, LA. R.S. 17:416 (1950), and LA.
R.S. 14:18 (1950). LA. R.S. 17:416 (1950): "Every teacher is authorized to hold
every pupil to a strict accountability for any disorderly conduct in school...."
LA. R.S. 14:18 (1950): "The fact that an offender's conduct is justifiable ...
shall constitute a defense to . .. any crime based on that conduct. This
defense .. .can be claimed .. .(4) When the offender's conduct is reasonable
discipline of minors by their parents, tutors, or teachers .. "
28. Roy v. Continental Ins. Co., 313 So. 2d 349, 354 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 318 So. 2d 47 (La. 1975).
29. LA. R.S. 17:416.1(a) (Supp. 1975).
30. LA. R.S. 17:416 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 216 § 1 (allows
suspension and expulsion of students according to guidelines it sets out).
[Vol. 36
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to a defense furnished by the school board and indemnifica-
tion by the board in the event of liability, unless the teacher
acts maliciously and intends bodily harm.3 1 To construe the
provision to mean that a teacher is protected only when the
punishment he administers is reasonable would render the
statute meaningless, since reasonable punishment is au-
thorized by the statute and should result in no liability. Thus,
a reasonable interpretation of § 416.1 would be that within
the undefined area between reasonable conduct and malicious
conduct, teachers who are in good faith but overstep the
bounds of reasonableness will be protected.32 Additionally,
whenever a teacher uses corporal punishment, he "intends"
bodily harm to some degree, however temporary or minor,
but since the use of physical punishment is authorized, to
read the exception literally as stripping a teacher of protec-
tion if he intends only slight harm would give an anomalous
meaning to the provision. Therefore, only when the punish-
ment is unreasonable and intended to cause great bodily
harm should the teacher be unprotected. 33
The Roy decision and the recent legislative enactment
clearly seem to indicate that teachers' reasonable corporal
punishment of students is authorized by the state itself in
Louisiana. Authorization by statute is consistent with the
dicta in Johnson, which stated that corporal punishment can-
not be justified by a presumption that parents delegate to
teachers their prerogative to physically punish. Since the
basis of the privilege recognized in Roy and in the new legis-
lative enactment is the state's interest in maintaining discip-
line in the schools, the authority for teachers to use corporal
punishment is no longer drawn impliedly from parents' send-
ing their children to school but rather from the state's power
to sanction such methods to accomplish its interest in orderly
functioning of its schools. However, it is necessary to deter-
31. LA. R.S. 17:416.1(B) (Supp. 1975).
32. In such a gray area indemnification may violate LA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 14 prohibiting the donation of public funds because, in such cases, the
teacher would be beyond the scope of his authority. A counter argument can
be made that by authorizing indemnification, the legislature has provided
that in such a situation a teacher will be within the course and scope of his
employment.
33. Since unreasonable punishment inflicted with such an intent would
be considered malicious, the terms "malicious" and "intended to cause bodily
harm" apparently are used synonomously.
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mine if there are any overriding constitutional considerations
to prevent a state's authorizing its teachers to utilize reason-
able physical discipline.
Parents' Constitutional Rights
Parents' constitutional attacks on statutes authorizing
reasonable corporal punishment by teachers have been based
on the existence of a parental right to be free from state
interference in the upbringing and education of one's child. In
Meyer v. Nebraska34 the United States Supreme Court struck
down as unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the teaching
of foreign languages to children who had not passed the eighth
grade level.35 While recognizing the state's interest in pro-
moting a homogeneous people and in encouraging the develop-
ment of American ideals and qualities in foreign members of
the population, the Court held that the Nebraska statute bore
no reasonable relation to the state's interest and constituted
an unreasonable interference with parents' right, protected
by the fourteenth amendment, to provide for and direct the
education of their children. 36 Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters37 an Oregon compulsory education statute which re-
quired all children to attend public schools was declared viola-
tive of parents' right to select their children's schools, be-
cause it bore no reasonable relation to the state's interest in
providing, regulating and promoting education. While the
Court clearly recognized a protected parental right to direct a
child's education, "long recognized at common law as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men, ' 38 its
use of the "reasonable relation" standard of due process to
balance the state interest against this right indicated that
the right was not a fundamental one. 39
34. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
35. Neb. Laws 1919, ch. 249 (repealed 1933).
36. 262 U.S. at 400-03.
37. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
38. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
39. While most rights protected by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment are not violated by a statute affecting the right if the
statute bears a "reasonable relation" to a legitimate state end, a statute
affecting "fundamental" rights must further a "compelling state interest" to
avoid violating due process. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v.
[Vol. 36
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When the Court recognized certain privacy rights as fun-
damental in Griswold v. Connecticut 40 and its progeny, 41 some
argued that the more stringent "compelling state interest"
standard of due process might be applied also to parents'
right to direct the training of children under their control. 42
However, the Supreme Court reiterated in Wisconsin v.
Yoder 43 that for a more stringent standard to be applied to
the parental interest in controlling the upbringing of their
children, the claim must be combined with another more fun-
damental right such as one emanating from the first amend-
ment free exercise clause.44 Although the non-fundamental
nature of parents' right to raise their children free from state
interference and the applicability of the reasonable relation
test to it were upheld in the context of a challenge to corporal
punishment in Ware v. Estes,4 s in Glaser v. Marietta46 a fed-
eral district court struck down a school policy to the extent
that it authorized corporal punishment despite parental ob-
jections. 47 While the court did not specify clearly what test it
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
42. Recent Decisions, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 645, 651 (1974).
43. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44. The Court reversed a conviction for violation of a compulsory educa-
tion law by Amish parents, finding that the combined free exercise and
parental liberty claims outweighed the state interest in compulsory educa-
tion. Id. at 233.
45. 328 F. Supp. 657, 658-59 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972): "Under the doctrine of Meyer
v. Nebraska . . .the state cannot unreasonably interfere with the liberty of
parents . . .to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control. These parental rights are not beyond limitation. Prince v. Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943) .... In order for a depriva-
tion of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to occur, the rules and
policies of the school district must bear 'no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State.' Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1924)." Accord Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ohio 1974).
46. 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
47. Authority to use corporal punishment at common law was generally
thought available regardless of the consent of the parents. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 153 (1965): "One who is in charge of the education or
training of a child as a public officer is privileged to inflict such reasonable
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applied, language in the opinion indicated that parents'
rights were considered fundamental. 48
The nature of parents' rights to prevent corporal
punishment apparently was resolved when the district court
decision in Baker v. Owen 49 was affirmed in a memorandum
opinion by the United States Supreme Court. In Baker, a
sixth-grader was paddled in a reasonable manner, over his
parents' prohibition, for violation of a rule; the district court
held that the punishment did not violate the parents' con-
stitutional right to control the nature of their children's edu-
cation. 50 While noting that parents' rights in Meyer, and
Pierce to control the nature of their children's education were
held to be within the fourteenth amendment's protection and
could be considered fundamental, 51 the district court ex-
pressly refused to so consider them.52 The court reasoned that
to deem as fundamental the parents' right to decide whether
corporal punishment could be used would impose a burden on
the state of showing a compelling state interest in authoriz-
ing corporal punishment, 53 and recognizing that to be an al-
most insurmountable obstacle, held that it was not justified
by the nature of the parental interest in preventing corporal
punishment.54 The decision is consistent with Meyer and
Pierce because, although the statutes in those cases were
struck down under a reasonable relation analysis, the nature
of the rights was different from that in Baker, thus justifying
differing results in the balancing process. The parental in-
terests in the Meyer and Pierce decisions in controlling the
substance of their children's education were, as the Baker
punishments as are necessary for the child's proper education or training,
notwithstanding the parent's prohibitions or wishes."
48. "[Wlhen the regulations [allowing corporal punishment] are con-
fronted with the flat prohibition of a particular parent and an assertion of
her fundamental rights to raise her child in the manner in which she chooses,
... the balancing process inherent in the Yoder... [case] becomes necessary."
Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555, 560 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (emphasis added).
49. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975) aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
50. In Meyer the right involved was the right to determine the substance
of the education received by their children. In Pierce the parents' right of
control over content (religious instruction in this case) was again involved as
well as their right to select the school their children attend in order to
receive the desired instruction.
51. 395 F. Supp. at 299.
52. Id.
53. See explanation in note 39, supra.
54. 395 F. Supp. at 299-300.
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court noted, "worthy of great deference due to . . . [their]
unquestioned acceptance throughout our history,"55 whereas
opposition to corporal punishment "bucks a settled tradition
of countenancing such punishment when reasonable. '5 6 The
district court also reiterated the state's interest in maintain-
ing school discipline, recognized in the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Goss v. Lopez,57 which applied procedural due process
safeguards to suspension of students, and decided that
reasonable corporal punishment bears a reasonable relation
to a state end that is not only legitimate, but "essential."58
A constitutional attack on a statute authorizing corporal
punishment of students without their parents' consent was
presented squarely to the Baker court, since they construed
the statute in question to authorize corporal punishment de-
spite parental objections.5" The affirmance by the Supreme
Court seems to resolve the issue in favor of the constitutional-
ity of such a legislative direction. Presumably, since a state
constitutionally may authorize a teacher to use corporal
punishment without parental consent, its use in the absence
of statutory authority or in the face of a statutory prohibition
would not be unconstitutional even though it violates state
law.
The Students' Constitutional Rights
Baker and the more recent Fifth Circuit case of Ingrahm
v. Wright6" inject confusion into the issues of the existence
and nature of a student's right to be free from corporal
punishment. Attacks on statutes authorizing reasonable cor-
poral punishment as violating the eighth amendment prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment have been consis-
tently rejected by the lower courts with indications that the
amendment is inapplicable in a civil context.6 1 However, since
55. Id. at 300.
56. Id.
57. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969).
58. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 301 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
59. Id. at 298.
60. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976).
61. Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973); Sims v. Board of Ed.,
329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex.
1971): Contra, Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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those cases rested their holdings on the assumption that the
eighth amendment, even if applicable, is not violated by au-
thorization or use of reasonable physical punishment, they
are not authority for the inapplicability per se of the amend-
ment in a civil context.6 2 When confronted with facts tending
to show that the punishment was unreasonably applied, how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit directly held in Ingrahm that the
eighth amendment is inapplicable to physical punishment in
public schools. 3
While a statute authorizing reasonable corporal punish-
ment should not violate the eighth amendment on its face,
arguably the amendment should apply to circumstances in-
volving the use of unreasonable punishment. The dissent in
Ingrahm points out that, although the eighth amendment
was drafted in the context of criminal sanctions, it must draw
its meaning from evolving standards of decency.M Thus, as
other constitutional rights change with our concept of or-
dered liberty, so should the scope of the eighth amendment. 65
As in the case of the rights of the parents to direct their
child's upbringing, a statute authorizing reasonable corporal
punishment is not, on its face, a violation of students' due
process rights because, assuming they have a protected in-
terest in being free from physical punishment, it is subject to
the countervailing state interest in maintaining discipline in
the classroom, to which such a statute bears a reasonable
62. But see Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ohio 1974) (by dismissing
an eighth amendment claim for lack of a substantial federal question, a
district court held the amendment inapplicable to corporal punishment in
schools).
63. Ingrahm v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 912-15 (5th Cir. 1976).
64. Id. at 923 (Rives, C.J., dissenting). E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
65. Even if the eighth amendment is held inapplicable to corporal
punishment in schools, a remedy may be available under the Louisiana
constitution of 1974. While similar to the eighth amendment, LA. CONST. art.
I, § 20 has a broader scope. By providing that "[n]o law shall subject any
person ... to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment," the section indicates
that imposing such punishment, including corporal punishment of school
children, may be prohibited. Although the argument can be made that
reasonable corporal punishment, while not cruel and unusual, is "excessive,"
it appears that due to the countervailing state interest in maintaining school
discipline, statutory authority for teachers' use of reasonable corporal
punishment should not be unconstitutional. Only when the punishment is
unreasonable would it be "excessive."
[Vol. 36
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relation.6 6 Ingrahm reaffirms this principle,67 but the Fifth
Circuit refused to delve into the factual circumstances to
ascertain if punishment was applied unreasonably, indicating
that the availability of state civil and criminal remedies was,
sufficient protection of students' interest in being free from
unreasonable physical punishment.69 This refusal appears in-
consistent with the court's application of a reasonable rela-
tion test to determine that the statute did not deny substan-
tive due process on its face because such an application im-
plies the existence of some interest worthy of constitutional
protection. Additionally, the district court in Baker clearly
recognized the existence of a student's right to be free from
arbitrary and unreasonable punishment 70 when it imposed
procedural due process guidelines.7 1 A constitutional right
should be protected from applications of state law which un-
reasonably interfere with the right. Thus, since a teacher
acting beyond his authority in administering unreasonable
corporal punishment nonetheless acts under color of state
law, 72 the circumstances of the punishment should be
scrutinized to determine if it was reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest. Presumably, unreasonable punish-
ment would not be so related, and would be a violation of
students' substantive due process right to be free from physi-
cal punishment; thus, the refusal of the court in Ingrahm to
use this analysis is open to criticism.
The district court in Baker held that a student is entitled
to minimal procedural safeguards to protect him from arbi-
trary and capricious punishment 73 and imposed specific
66. E.g., Sims v. Board of Ed., 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971).
67. Ingrahm v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1976).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 915.
70. The Baker court found a protectible interest when it stated that "the
legal system, once quite tolerant of physical punishment in many contexts,
has become less so .... While the state historically has been granted broader
powers over children than over adults ... the Supreme Court has explicitly
recognized that children have rights, too .... Thus, although the weight of
legal authority still permits corporal punishment of public school children ...
it seems uncontrovertible that the child has a legitimate interest in avoiding
unnecessary or arbitrary infliction of a punishment that probably would be
completely disallowed as to an adult." Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 301-02
(M.D.N.C. 1975).
71. See discussion of procedural due process in text at note 74, infra.
72. Ingrahm v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 921 (Rives, C.J., dissenting).
73. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 301-02 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
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guidelines in this regard. 74 However, because the Baker deci-
sion was appealed only by the parents and only the parental
right to prohibit corporal punishment was at issue, the
applicability of procedural due process was not decided by the
Supreme Court. In Ingrahm, the Fifth Circuit did not follow
that portion of the Baker district court opinion7 5 and refused
to impose procedural due process guidelines, holding that
students' right to be free from corporal punishment was not a
significant constitutional right.76
As previously stated, this holding is inconsistent with the
Fifth Circuit's earlier application in Ingrahm of the reasona-
ble relation test to determine the substantive due process
issue, which implied the existence of a student's right to be
free from unreasonable physical punishment worthy of some
constitutional protection. 77 The court distinguished corporal
punishment from suspensions, to which due process has been
applied in Goss v. Lopez, 78 as a much less serious event, not
involving an exclusion from the educational process.7 9 How-
ever, the severity of the deprivation should be irrelevant as
long as the deprivation is not de minimis. 80 One plaintiff in
Ingrahm required more than ten days rest at home following
the physical punishment he received, and the same length of
74. "[E]xcept for those acts of misconduct which are so antisocial or
disruptive in nature as to shock the conscience, corporal punishment may
never be used unless the student was informed beforehand that specific
misbehavior could occasion its use, and, subject to this exception, it should
never be employed as a first line of punishment for misbehavior. The re-
quirements of an announced possibility of corporal punishment and an at-
tempt to modify behavior by some other means-keeping after school, assign-
ing extra work, or some other punishment-will insure that the child has
clear notice that certain behavior subjects him to physical punishment. ...
A teacher or principal must punish corporally only in the presence of a
second school official (teacher or principal), who must be informed beforehand
and in the student's presence of the reason for the punishment. The student
need not be afforded a formal opportunity to present his side to the second
official; the requirement is intended only to allow a student to protest, spon-
taneously, an egregiously arbitrary or contrived application of punishment.
An official who has administered such punishment must provide the
child's parent, upon request, a written explanation of his reasons and the
name of the second official who was present." Id. at 302-03.
75. Ingrahm v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 918 (5th Cir. 1976).
76. Id. at 919.
77. See discussion in text beginning at note 60, supra.
78. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
79. 525 F.2d at 918-19.
80. 419 U.S. at 576.
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time was deemed more than a de minimis deprivation in the
Goss suspensions.8 ' As the dissent in Ingrahm points out,
whether a student is excluded from the educational process
due to an arbitrary suspension or an arbitrary punishment
causing injury, the deprivation is the same.8 2
The Ingrahm court also based its refusal to impose pro-
cedural guidelines on the ground that such requirements
would destroy the effectiveness of corporal punishment.
8 3
While the guidelines set out in Baker may present some prac-
tical problems, 84 the court in Baker accepted the argument
that elaborate procedures were not appropriate, and imposed
only minimal procedures similar to those in Goss.
Conclusions
Until the United States Supreme Court is confronted with
the question of the necessity vel non of procedural due pro-
cess safeguards prior to infliction of corporal punishment,
school officials cannot be sure if the distinction between sus-
pensions and corporal punishment drawn in Ingrahm will be
upheld. Due to the implications of Goss, the Supreme Court
will perhaps not follow Ingrahm's rationale, but instead will
probably find corporal punishment as serious as suspensions
and impose procedural due process requirements. For this
reason, perhaps the safest course is to implement some mini-
mal procedures until the question is decided. The resolution
of the issue will be important for several reasons and may
present new problems.
A finding that the distinction between suspensions and
corporal punishment outlined in Ingrahm is correct would
preclude any constitutional attack by parents or students
based solely on the unreasonable use of corporal punish-
ment;815 however, if procedural due process is held applicable
to instances of corporal punishment, the court will recognize
impliedly that a student right entitled to some constitutional
protection exists, and punishment unreasonably applied, even
though meeting procedural due process requirements, may
81. Id.
82. 525 F.2d 926-29 (Rives, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 919.
84. See discussion in text following note 77, supra.
85. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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need to meet the reasonable relation test necessary to avoid
denying substantive due process. In that event, since reason-
able corporal punishment does not violate the eighth
amendment, and protection against unreasonable punish-
ment would be afforded by the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause, the determination of the eighth amendment's
applicability to corporal punishment situations becomes un-
necessary.8 6
While it is presently clear that a reasonable use of cor-
poral punishment is constitutional, if procedural due process
limitations are imposed, even when reasonable corporal
punishment is used, a failure to follow procedural guidelines
would violate the constitution. The implementation and ap-
plication of procedural due process guidelines set forth in
Baker may present new problems, however. Particularly
difficult is the requirement that:
except for those acts of misconduct which are so antiso-
cial or disruptive in nature as to shock the conscience,
corporal punishment may never be used unless the stu-
dent was informed beforehand that specific misbehavior
could occasion its use .... 87
In what circumstances is behavior so disruptive as to
shock the conscience, and who is to decide? School officials
would have little to guide them until content is given to the
guidelines. However, the Goss guidelines may offer some as-
sistance in this regard. In Goss the court allowed immediate
suspension when the student is a danger to others or presents
an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process. 8 A
parallel can be drawn that would suggest that the same con-
duct justifying immediate suspension should authorize cor-
poral punishment without forewarning.
86. Because of the prior indications in the cases that the eighth amend-
ment is inapplicable in a civil context, it seems more likely that the protec-
tion of 4 student's interest in avoiding unreasonable physical punishment
would be accomplished through the use of fourteenth amendment procedural
and substantive due process to preserve his right to personal privacy. See
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt.
1973); Sims v. Board of Ed., 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971); Ware v. Estes, 328
F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971). But see Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir.
1974).
87. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 302 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
88. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 575, 582 (1974).
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In addition, given the infinite variety of misbehavior in
which students indulge, drafting meaningful rules that would
be effective in controlling disruptive behavior without being
so vague as to forewarn students inadequately may be
difficult. In short, if procedural due process is imposed, future
cases will need to give content to the guidelines.
Since the recent decisions at least assure that reasonable
corporal punishment is constitutional as well as probably au-
thorized under Louisiana law, and since the availability of
constitutional grounds to attack unreasonable punishment
has no bearing on state civil and criminal remedies, the ques-
tions most crucial to Louisiana school administrators and
teachers have been answered. However, the uncertainty over
the necessity of procedural safeguards remains a problem. As
most teachers and parents will affirm readily, discipline in
schools is a problem that has reached extraordinary propor-
tions.89 Therefore, in order to insure certainty in the methods
and proper means available in the administration of corporal
punishment to enforce school discipline, the Supreme Court
should decide the applicability of procedural due process to
corporal punishment of students at the first opportunity.
Stephen W. Glusman
89. A recent poll shows that parents consider discipline the number one
problem in schools today. Terror in Schools, U.S. News & World Report, Jan.,
1975, at 54. A survey by a special subcommittee of the Technical Assistance
Division of the Louisiana Department of Education of the reactions of stu-
dents, parents and principals to the Baker v. Owen decision indicates that, of
those responding, the majority in all three categories are in favor of corporal
punishment and support the decision. Telephone interview with Eugene
Limar, Technical Assistance Division, Louisiana Department of Education,
in Baton Rouge, April 1, 1976.
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